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Abstract 
Our society and educational system promote a definition of 
the Middle East that relates exclusively to American self-
interest, thereby ignoring the also important diverse cultures 
and people of this area. This situation is not likely to change 
radically at any time in the future. The prevailing patterns of 
thought that America has about the Middle East are so deeply 
ingrained that change will only corne about with conscious effort. 
Our government, media and scholars, as a whole, do not recognize 
the significance of this problem, further diminishing the 
likelihood of it being fully addressed. 
Introduction 
The Middle East remains a veritable mystery in the minds of 
most Americans. This situation, however, has not arisen out of a 
conscious ignorance about this region. The way that we, as 
Americans, think about the Middle East has been fashioned within 
a frame of reference spanning the history of Western intervention 
in affairs pertaining to the economics and politics of the 
different countries in the Middle East. stereotypes and cliches 
about the people, culture, and religion of the Middle East have 
pervaded the American mind in a repetitive cycle over the years, 
preventing a broader understanding of this region. Our 
government, media, and even our scholars compound this problem in 
their dealings with and research of the Middle East. 
This thesis focuses on how misconceptions about the Middle 
East are perpetuated through the politics, foreign policy 
decisions, media flaws and limitations, and intellectual elite of 
the united states. The bulk of the research involved in this 
work concentrates expressly on the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. 
Throughout the history of Iran, there is significant historical 
data that can be related to the ultimate consequences resulting 
from the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah in 1979. However, most 
Americans believe that these events stemmed from the leadership 
of the "fanatical" Ayatollah Khomeini. Our media, through 
governmental sources, emphasized the role of Khomeini when it 
provided the American public with information about the unrest in 
Iran. The figure of Khomeini dominated the headlines and news 
articles presented to the American public, while many more 
important factors in the broad history of this country were 
neglected. More recently, similar tendencies relating to 
coverage of the Middle East have been demonstrated through the 
American-led operation Desert storm against the actions of Saddam 
Hussein. 
The way that Americans view the Middle East needs to be 
challenged at its root. Those who claim to be "informing" 
continually reinforce the narrow images of the Middle East that 
dwell in the minds of the American public about the Middle East 
-- the media and our government. These misguided preconceptions 
must be addressed before one can attempt a careful analysis of 
any aspect of these countries, religions, or leaders. 
A Focus on the Problem 
Certain guiding images arise automatically when we think of 
the Middle East. Screaming fanatics who periodically kneel and 
pray to a god called "Allah", bomb-packing terrorists who blow up 
jumbo-jets full of innocent people, and oppressed women clad in a 
mysterious dress-like garment that covers their bodies from head 
to toe are only a few general images that bombard the minds of 
Americans today. This onslaught, unconsciously processed, 
affects how we understand the people, culture, and politics of 
the Middle East. 
The only glimpses that most Americans have of the Middle 
East come from the television media. Without even visiting this 
region or meeting someone from one of the countries, Americans 
believe that we know what the Middle East looks and feels like 
based on the images that CNN or NBC conveniently display for us 
every evening on their various news programs. They presented us 
with footage that focused on only a fraction of the totally 
encompassing people and their cultures. 
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The Western world's perceptions about this highly 
politicized group of countries are based largely upon stereotypes 
and cliches that are reinforced through the generation of foggy 
images, brought to us through our media, intellectuals, and 
political leadership. This situation is extremely unfortunate, 
preventing the American people from understanding what is 
happening in the Middle East. 
America's knowledge about the Middle East finds its roots in 
orientalism and ethnocentrism. oriental ism places all history 
within a context of Western thought patterns and values, 
generally patronizing and degrading the characteristics of 
cultures outside of this structure. Many instructors and 
professors in our nation's colleges and universities perpetuate 
orientalist thinking in the way that they describe Middle Eastern 
culture and history. The Crusades against the Muslims, the 
Saracens, or sometimes the "Turks" in the 1100s are viewed as 
unquestionably justified on account of our Judeo-Christian 
heritage. Unfortunately, professors "forget" the significance of 
Palestine to the Muslims, thus depriving their students of a 
complete understanding of these historical events and 
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perpetuating religious antagonisms. 
Ethnocentrism is a "we're the best and the rest of the world 
is backward" attitude that is highly prevalent in the West, 
especially regarding the Middle East. The dominant Middle 
Eastern religion, Islam, is looked down on by many Americans as 
violent or heretical. This opinion is based on images and 
interpretations often derived from television, that do not 
reflect expertise or first-hand knowledge about Islam. However, 
many uninformed people think that they thoroughly understand the 
Prophet Mohammed and the rise of Islam. Their definition of the 
religion of Islam might include ideas of polygamy, oppression of 
women, long and sharp swords used to slit Christian throats, or 
an irritating guy screaming out the call to worship at some 
unimaginably early hour of the morning. 
Together with the perpetuation of stereotypical attributes, 
orientalist and ethnocentric thinking places all new knowledge 
about Islam, and consequently the Middle East, within a narrow 
framework which contributes to this "monolithic" attitude. Over 
and over this process is repeated as new events surface relating 
to the Middle East, preventing an understanding of this highly 
complex region. By defining this region in these terms, American 
objectives in relationship to the Middle East are too swiftly 
and often tragically defined. 
Our society and educational system promote a definition of 
the Middle East that relates exclusively to American self-
interest, thereby ignoring the also important diverse cultures 
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and people of this area. This situation is not likely to 
change radically at any time in the future. The prevailing 
patterns of thought that America has about the Middle East are so 
deeply ingrained that change will only come about with conscious 
effort. Our government, media and scholars, as a whole, do not 
recognize the significance of this problem, further diminishing 
the likelihood of it being fully addressed. 
We must recognize this strange twist in the thinking that 
dominates our knowledge of the Middle East in order to understand 
the conflicts and relationships that the countries and leaders in 
this region have had with the united states. The images that 
dominate this mentality are a powerful tool for those who know 
how to manipulate them. Specifically, images of Iran during the 
Revolutionary years of 1978 and 1979 were implicit and central in 
the West's and especially America's definition of "Islam" as a 
whole. 1 Iran, because of its oil-producing capabilities, 
America's support of the shah, and the hostage crisis, has become 
uniquely a focal point by which the American media and 
intellectual circles have involved themselves in the "study" of 
the entire Middle East until recent times. Today, this point has 
shifted; we see Saddam Hussein in the light that once shone on 
the Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Many of the images associated with Khomeini are easily 
transferable to Saddam Hussein, yet these men had very different 
1 Edward said, Covering Islam (New York: 
introduction. 
Panthenon, 1988), 
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objectives and reasoning behind their motives. These profound 
differences are lost an America lost in its all-encompassing 
image of a monolithic Islam. The Revolution of 1978-79 relates 
to the history of Iran and various events that affected the 
populations of this country, as well as Iran's place in the 
international arena. There were many factors that influenced 
this situation, not just the deeds of the Ayatollah Khomeini. 
The long tradition of Shi'ism and the history of societal 
struggles in Iran are two central factors. 
Historical Background about Iran 
The evolution of Iran into a "modern", theocratic state 
traces a path many centuries long. Shi'ism was declared the 
official religion of Iran in 1501, during the rule of Ismail, the 
founder of the Safavid dynasty. This "Twelver" Shi'ism soon 
thoroughly permeated the culture of Iran. It is based on the 
notion that leadership within the Muslim community passed down 
from Mohammed through a blood line of specific imams. 2 However, 
the twelfth imam, the mahdi or Messiah, somehow disappeared 
during the ninth century. This "Lord of the Age" will return, 
according to the Shi'ite tradition, to create a government and 
establish a leadership for the people of Islam. 3 
The entire structure of Iranian life evolved in a way 
2 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown (New York: 
Oxford University Press., 1988), 12. 
3 Shaul Bakhash, "Iran," The American Historical Review. 96.5 
(1992): 1479. 
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that provided the Shi'ite clerical leadership a prominent and 
integral position. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
the Iranian clerical powers went through a process of 
consolidation. The result was to clarify religious doctrine and 
centralize their hierarchical leadership. This transformation 
further strengthened the role of the Shi'ite clergy in Iranian 
society under the Safavids by increasing the ulama's political 
pressure on the government. The growing strength of the Shi'ite 
clergy as a religious authority related directly to its 
increasing political role in Iranian society.4 The ulama was 
important to the Safavids, but not in an independent sense. 
within the Safavid hierarchy there were appointed religious 
officials who allowed the government to exercise a great deal of 
control over the religion. 5 
From this time, the religious clergy and the secular 
leadership became increasingly polarized over how to approach the 
political, social, and economic affairs of Iran. In the late 
Safavid period, many of the high Shi'ite religious leaders, as a 
result of their steadily growing power at the expense of the 
Safavid Shahs, began to believe that the people should look to 
them for authority.6 
By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the mujtahids or 
4 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 12. 
5 Nikki R. Keddie, Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society 
(London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1980), 90. 
6 Ibid., 92. 
the high Shi'ite clerics in Iran were claiming more and more 
legitimacy over guiding the community.7 At the time of the 
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unpopular Qajar Dynasty of the late eighteenth through the early 
twentieth centuries, the clerical structure took a leadership 
role in many of the protest movements against growing economic 
strife. The Qajar government's practice of increasing the 
importation of foreign manufactured goods threatened many urban 
handicraft workers' livelihoods. This trade influx combined with 
food shortages and price rises, greatly injured the large 
population of artisans and small shopkeepers. 8 One must 
understand this situation is crucial because of the Shi'ite 
clergy's traditional role as spokesmen for the bazaris or urban 
merchants. 9 More importantly, the ulama began to grow more and 
more independently wealthy, thus becoming less dependent on the 
shahs for support. 10 
Throughout the two centuries prior to the Revolution of 
1978-79, there are specific indications of societal unrest over 
government practices, as well as a marked rise in the prestige of 
the clerical powers among the population in Iran. The media in 
our country failed or "refused" to understand this past. There 
are causes for this inability to understand. The Iranians with 
7 Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven: 
Yale UP.), 89. 
8Edmund Bosworth and Carole Hillenbrand, (eds) , Qaj ar Iran 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP.), 48. 
9 Ibid., 49. 
10 Keddie , Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society, 93. 
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whom our media interacted concerning interpretations of the 
problems in Iran were from the ranks of the "Westernized elite." 
These Iranians had been educated in a way that discredited the 
religious emphasis in their country. These individuals ignored 
the centrality of the Shi'ite religion and culture in most 
Iranian's lives, which was an acceptable and comprehensible 
stance according to the u.s. government. American journalists 
only heard and saw the political interpretations of these elite 
Iranians, which seemed perfectly rational from a "Western" point 
of view. An "average" Iranian from Tehran would have probably 
expressed to the media a much different view about the political, 
economic, and societal situations in Iran. Such a perspective 
would have emphasized the Shi'ite clergy as a legitimate body of 
power. Unfortunately, American reporters did not have access to 
such people. 
During the nineteenth century, the ulama also became 
increasingly political, focusing on the negative, Westernizing 
reforms perpetuated by the Qajar Crown Princes under the pressure 
of Great Britain. 11 The British did grant "progressive" 
reforms, many of which were largely unrealized, such as tighter 
control of the state purse and taxpayer. 12 
opposition to the Qajars culminated with the constitutional 
crises that occurred between 1905 and 1911. This period also 
11 Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran, 94. 
12 
Press) , 
Sepher 
5. 
Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, (Chicago: Lake View 
12 
contributed a significant turning point for the ulama with 
regards to their participation in state politics. The clergy 
were not the driving force in understanding constitutional 
implications, yet they recognized the popular feelings of 
nationalism and injustice that had penetrated into the Iranian 
population. 13 The Qajars were unable to compete with the 
respect within the population that the ulama had cUltivated 
through their deeply-believed Shi'ite religious philosophy.14 
Perhaps, the ulama recognized in these events a situation where 
they could grasp a few more bits of political power within the 
Iranian community.15 It was important for the clergy to support 
this popular movement in order to maintain its growing prestige 
in the Iranian community as a whole. 16 
In the twentieth century, a dual leadership structure 
between the Shi'ite clergy and the dynastic leaders slowly 
emerged. An understanding of the dualistic system between the 
leadership hierarchies of the Shi'ite clergy and the dynastic 
secular rulers, combined with the wide-spread government 
dissatisfaction with the government, could possibly answer some 
questions about why the Shi'ite clergy under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Khomeini was able to take power after the Revolution of 
1978-79. 
13 Bosworth and Hillenbrand, Qajar Iran, 51. 
14 Keddie, Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society, 97. 
15 Bakhash, "Iran," 1481. 
16 Bosworth and Hillenbrand, Qajar Iran, 52. 
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The Pahlavi dynasty, beginning with Reza Khan in 1924, 
provided the last polishes that ultimately led to the Iranian 
governmental structure of today. After World War I, 
disillusionment with the work of the constitutional regime, which 
was largely under the influence of Great Britain, led to a desire 
among the leadership hierarchy and the Iranian population for 
stiffer governmental control from the Shah. Reza Pahlavi Shah 
took the initiative, yet did so in a way that troubled the 
Shi'ite clergy. By concentrating on "material Westernization", 
Reza Pahlavi brought a great influx of Western capital and 
investments into Iran. This action proved detrimental to the 
Iranian working and middle classes as Western imports crippled 
more and more of their traditional work niches. In a mirror 
image of the last days of the Qajar dynasty, further alienation 
of these populations allowed the Shi'ite clergy to gain 
legitimacy in the minds of these Iranians. 17 
Reza Pahlavi worked to drastically reduce the ulama's 
political power by restricting it to the private religious 
sphere. His government changed many institutions previously 
dominated by religious authority, especially modern court 
authority and schools. This mass process of centralization the 
1940s, modeled on the work of Ataturk in Turkey, contributed to 
the growth of the Shi'ite clergy's power by forcibly bringing 
into the cities people previously dispersed in rural, tribal 
areas. 
17 Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, 5. 
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The basic and most important level of Iranian political and 
religious organization is localized within the village or small 
town. The actions taken by Reza Pahlavi thus served to alienate 
much of the lower and middle class population. 18 Western 
programs that ran counter to the Shi'ite tradition, coupled with 
mass centralization, shook the foundations of Iranian society. 
In addition to this, during World War II, British and Soviet 
troops invaded Iran to secure oil fields and safe routes to the 
USSR. They deposed Reza Pahlavi and installed his twenty-two 
year-old son, Mohammed Reza, under whom the leadership in Iran 
was once again to demonstrate to its people its insensitivity to 
their needs and wants. The influx of Western ideas and 
influences ran counter to what most of the population in Iran 
desired. The clergy was able make sUbstantial gains in authority 
and legitimacy as the working and middle class Iranians turned 
away from the government under Reza Pahlavi and his son, Mohammed 
Reza. 
Mohammed Reza's appointment of Mosaddeq as Prime Minister in 
the Iranian Parliament is of the utmost importance. It was the 
"culmination of popular nationwide struggle to eliminate the 
politico-economic influence of Great Britain, as a means to 
reassert national independence and improve the material lot of 
the Iranian people. ,,19 The young shah appointed Mosaddeq as the 
new prime minister in the early 1950s to combat the increasingly 
18 Ibid., 17. 
19 . Ibld., 3. 
nationalist revolts against foreign intervention, not realizing 
the true political struggle in store. 
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The power and legitimacy of the Shah came under new fire by 
Prime Minister Mosaddeq from one side, and by the clergy on the 
other. Nor could these two authorities cooperate. Mosaddeq was 
a strictly secular liberal politician, creating problems for the 
increasingly politicized ulama. Mosaddeq believed that the ulama 
could play an important role in mobilizing the masses, but could 
not accept the possibility of the clergy seeking executive power. 
Thus, three recognizable leadership structures each struggled to 
assert their own authority: the ulama, Mosaddeq, and the 
Shah. 20 The ulama, fearful of secularism, leaned toward the 
power of the Shah in the early 1950s, as opposed to Mosaddeq, yet 
they still remained a separate authority.21 
Between Mosaddeq and Mohammed Reza there was a great 
controversy over who had the right to be the primary influence 
over national affairs including diplomacy, the military, and 
especially the nationalization of oil.22 The Shah's increasing 
use of the army as a political tool to reinforce his political 
power in Iran incited Mosaddeq to attempt to restore the army to 
its "purely non-political function as a subordinate body to the 
government".23 In 1953, however, the British and U.S., 
20 Ibid. , 14. 
21 Ibid. , 15. 
22 Ibid. , 7l. 
23 Ibid. , 72. 
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recognizing the possible negative consequences of Mosaddeq's 
challenge to the Shah, the supposed internal "threat" of 
communism from the Tudeh Party, and ultimately the security of 
Western interests in the region of the Middle East, organized 
operation Ajax to oust the prime minister. 24 
From this time onwards, Iranians no longer regarded the U.S. 
as lIinnocent. 1I The Iranian people, the Shi'ite clergy, and the 
leadership realized that they would now have to figure the vested 
interests of yet another Western power into their country's 
political agenda. More importantly, they viewed the American 
involvement in the overthrow of Mosaddeq as imperialist and 
interventionist. America has become the USSR and Great Britain 
of the past. 25 Even without the purported involvement of the 
CIA in this event, nationalism and the power of the clergy were 
on the rise precursors to the revolution to corne twenty-five 
years later. 
Nevertheless, our media, specifically the newspapers that we 
read each day, did not explain to us this situation. The New York 
Times ran two short articles concerning Iran and Mosaddeq on 
August 15 and 16. A story three inches long on the bottom of 
page five entitled IIMossadegh Charges Distortion on Iran" was the 
only acknowledgment of the crisis in Iran. The August 15 article 
expressly emphasized a statement made by the "Cold Warrior", 
24 Gary Sick, All Fall Down, (New York: Random House), 6. 
25 James Bill, 
University Press.), 
The 
26. 
Eagle and the Lion (New Haven: Yale 
secretary of state, John Foster Dulles: 
. the Mossadegh Government's tolerance of the 
Communists increased the difficulties in the way 
of united states economic assistance. 26 
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with the recent conflicts in Korea, communism could be used as a 
scapegoat in any political situation, as Dulles illustrated in 
this article. Our media could easily concentrate on the 
"communist" aspect of any foreign policy decision, ignore other 
aspects of the Iranian situation, and find approval from both the 
American public and government. 
Yet communism and the Communist Tudeh party played a 
relatively minor role in Iranian affairs at this time. 
Furthermore, these political aspects were not even particularly 
"Iranian". Despite this, the American media's orientalist 
tendencies caused our newspapers to focus on this issue and 
neglect the other forces working in Iran. Our media, working 
within a Western mindset, disastrously interpreted the events 
happening in the Middle Eastern country of Iran in this way and 
observed it through Western definitions. 
The next day, a confusing article, "Mossadegh Terms Majlis 
Dissolved", was positioned on page thirty of the New York Times. 
The ideas expressed in the article tend to support Mosaddeq, 
while hinting about what had actually happened to him. It is 
doubtful that anyone could really know what had taken place in 
Tehran based upon this half-hearted attempt at information: 
u The New York Times, 15 August, 1953. 
The Iranian Majlis, the lower house of Parliament, 
which last month threatened to oust Premier 
Mossadegh with votes of no confidence, was declared 
today to have been dissolved as the result of 
the referendum completed this week, in which 99.94 
per cent of the voters using non-secret ballots took 
the Premier's side in his quarrels with his chamber. 27 
This lack of information however is quite understandable 
considering the Iranian government's crackdown on "anti-state" 
publications until almost ten years after Mosaddeq's defeat. 28 
The Iranian government's control over the press concerning this 
event is comparable with major u.s. newspapers' lack of a broad 
coverage concerning the actual events surrounding the ouster of 
Mosaddeq. Perhaps, our government played a role in suppressing 
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information about the role of our CIA in this entire fiasco. Our 
newspapers sent their reporters to find information about what 
was going on in Iran. The best place to gather information about 
the transitions in Iran was assumed to be from u.s. government 
sources. 
The U.S. Government and the Media 
The government plays a crucial role in the news coverage of 
the mass media. Economics largely dictates newspaper coverage. 
In other words, newspaper corporations can not possibly afford 
the costs involved in maintaining a reliable flow of raw news 
material. Financial concerns force news agencies to concentrate 
their resources in places where news and important rumors and 
27 The New York Times, 16 August, 1953. 
28 Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, preface. 
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leaks are likely to abound. The Pentagon, the White House, and 
other places in washington D.C. are central to such activity.29 
This situation has many advantages, but it tends to create news 
that has been fashioned in a way that suits the needs of the 
bureaucrat or lawmaker who is supplying the information. 
Information released from government agencies has to appease 
many different interests. These interests mold the "news" in a 
way that is strikingly unobjective. 30 The press is not entirely 
guilty; who better to get foreign policy news from than the 
foreign policy makers? Yet the approach severely limits the 
channels of information. In general, the U.S. media: 
. permits -- indeed, encourages -- spirited debate, 
criticism, and dissent, as long as these remain 
faithfully within the system of presuppositions and 
principles that constitute an elite consensus, a 
system so powerful as to be internalized largely 
without awareness. 31 
Regarding Iran in the 1950s, the U.S. government had a few things 
that it wanted to say in a way that would reinforce the United 
States' position in the Middle East. The press's dependency on 
government agencies for a steady flow of news tainted the "whole 
story" surrounding Mosaddeq in Iran. 
After Operation Ajax (wiping Iran "clean" of the likes of 
Mosaddeq) in 1953, the United States became increasingly involved 
with the political and economic policy of Iran. While the people 
29 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent 
(New York: Panthenon), 18. 
30 I bid., 2 2 . 
31 Ibid., 302. 
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of Iran became sensitized to the united states role in their 
country, most Americans remained ill-informed. The economic 
results of the united states' involvement in the political 
upheaval in Iran was felt by all Iranians as their lives began to 
be affected by Mohammed Reza's policies into the 1960s. Could 
Americans have known about Mosaddeq or the growing u.s. interests 
in Iran in 1953? 
The Korean Conflict and "Reds", which were on the minds of 
most Americans, were the focus of the u.s. media, instead of the 
significance of the problems in the nation of Iran. The actions 
of our CIA in preserving our nation's self-interest in Iran would 
not have "sold" in 1953. The economic limitations of the press 
forced them to print what would bring in profits to their 
corporations. communism was selling; who would have cared about 
our interests with "Muslims?" On the front page of the August 
15, 1953 New York Times, the three main articles are "U.N. 
Demands Foe Return All P.O.W. 's Who Wish Release", "Allied Split 
Likely to Leave Korea Parley Bids Up to U.N.", and "First Steps 
Taken by Non-Red French to Settle Strikes", demonstrating the 
press's economic and consequent journalistic priorities. 
From 1953 until the late 1960s, Mohammed Reza Shah became 
obsessed with the need for military strength. The United states 
helped quell this "need" by selling him most of the arms that he 
wanted. His acquisition reached almost scandalous levels. The 
united States complied with the Shah because of interest in oil 
and the fear of Soviet intervention in the region. The Shah "saw 
the need for a strong military and the danger of permitting a 
rival (like Mosaddeq) close to the seat of real power".32 
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By the early 1960s, the figure of Khomeini began to play 
against the Shah's wishes by encouraging a series of revolts 
against what he termed "westoxication," that is, the increasing 
western economic and societal reforms and ideologies promoted by 
Mohammed Reza. These revolts went virtually unreported in the 
united states. 33 Issues surrounding communism in Cuba and other 
parts of Central America (i.e. "The Bay of Pigs" and "The Cuban 
Missile Crisis") obsessed our pol icymakers , and thus were heavily 
reported in the press. opposition to the Shah in Iran was 
mounting, yet the American government and the American press 
followed Mohammed Reza's lead in ignoring how his reforms 
affected his people. 
Mohammed Reza Shah introduced a series of land reforms and 
more "western" reforms, including women's right to vote and 
various capitalistic schemes. These programs (the "White" 
Revolution) show how the strengthening of the Shah's personal 
power went hand in hand with the entire structure of "reform". 
During the early 1970s, Iran experienced tremendous economic 
growth. However this "super growth" was almost exclusively due 
to oil and other advanced investment projects including turbo 
trains and nuclear power plants. The "high-tech" focus of Iran's 
domestic spending left agriculture and urban investment virtually 
32 Sick, All Fall Down, 9. 
33 I bid. I 1 0 . 
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stagnant. The agriculturally-based rural population of Iran fled 
into the cities by the millions creating urban problems and 
widespread dissatisfaction towards the government of Reza 
Pahlavi. 34 
People in Iran, mostly in rural agricultural settings and 
urban working class niches, cramped by the domestic spending 
emphasis espoused by Mohammed Reza, noticed their country's 
problems in the 1970s Nevertheless, the u.s. government 
encouraged these actions, as well as the role of American 
interests in this scheme. Our government simply did not consider 
the implications that these measures had on millions of people in 
Iran. 
As a result of growing tensions, the Shah used the SAVAK, 
the secret police force of the government, to "quell" problem 
areas. The SAVAK (a Farsi acronym for the National Security and 
Information Organization), became increasingly active, and the 
disgruntled populations in Iran learned to hate it during the 
1970s. 35 His own people regarded the behavior of Mohammed Reza 
Shah as an insult. Further, the steadily increasing wealth of 
the Shah's court sharply contrasted with the wide-spread poverty 
among the poor and working class people of his country.36 
In this light, the Revolution of 1978 should not have been a 
surprise to anyone in Iran or America. 
34 I bid., 12. 
35 b' d I 1 ., 23. 
36 I bid., 3 4 • 
It was a revolution of 
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outraged people against a repressive regime. But, this rebellion 
was a shock to many Iranians and virtually all Americans. We did 
not know about Khomeini or why he hated America so much. Why 
did the U.S. media remain silent about this reasonably accessible 
information? 
The Revolution of 1978-79 
All of this political and social upheaval, as well as the 
dissolving power of the Shah's regime, created a situation in 
which the clerical hierarchy could gain support among the poorer 
Iranians feeling the brunt of the Shah's oppression. In 1977-78, 
the urban poor became the dominant force in the explosive 
discontent. Since the Shi'ite clergy had traditionally been the 
most effective and popular among the poor, religious leaders were 
able to direct the course of events. 37 As the political state 
under Mohammed Reza Shah crumbled, the Shi'ite clergy, epitomized 
in the person of the Ayatollah Khomeini, became stronger than 
ever.38 
Throughout 1978, the U.S. press approached this complex 
situation by asserting that the revolt was guided by anti-modern 
forces, including the Ayatollah Khomeini who then living in exile 
in france. The Revolution in Iran was reactionary, from the 
point of view of the U.S. press, because the entire situation was 
37 William Dorman and Mansour farhang, The U.S. Press and Iran 
(Berkeley: The University of California Press), 4. 
38 Bakhash, "Iran," 1495. 
viewed from a "Western" standpoint. 
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It was incomprehensible that 
religion could playa significant role in a future government in 
Iran. Our government knew that unrest was a problem there, but 
continued to reaffirm its commitment to the Shah. The Shah's 
power base was crumbling, yet American interests were rooted in 
the perpetuation of his regime. The Shah was an economic and 
military "friend" of the united States and an espouser of Western 
economic values in his country. In order for the united States 
to continue its "progressive" role in the Middle East, 
specifically in Iran, the Shah or leaders like him needed to be 
supported. Khomeini, not fitting America's definition, was 
portrayed as an evil man, motivated by the heretical religion of 
Shi'ism. Few realized that Khomeini had some persuasive and even 
legitimate ideas -- considering the past centuries of Shi'ite 
influence in the lives of the Iranian people -- about the future 
of Iran. 
Khomeini fused the ulama in Iranian society and led them in 
a new direction. This formulation advocated Islamic political 
activism on the part of the Shi'ite clergy as a means of 
achieving "justice" in Iranian society. This tendency had long 
been present within the Iranian governmental structure; however 
Khomeini envisioned a need for a concrete application of Shi'ism 
as supreme law. 39 "Fundamental" Shi' ism, with Khomeini as its 
chief interpreter, became the ideology that harnessed troubled 
Iran in 1979: 
39 I bid., 1482. 
Khomeini's personality, ability to be all things 
to social groups, and astute management of the 
protest movement allowed him to capture the 
leadership of the revolution. 4o 
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In the end, Khomeini became the symbolic leader of the theocratic 
state of Iran. 
The U.S. Newspapers and Iran 
Many journalists emphasize the Ayatollah Khomeini as a 
"strong man" who acted alone in his determination to dissolve the 
regime of Mohammed Reza. Such characterizations are common. 
There is a great tendency among our journalists to see the 
politics of the "Third World" as "revolving around and synonymous 
wi th a strongman". 41 From a ethnocentric point of view, the 
people living in the countries that comprise the Third World can 
be ruled in no other way. For the U.S. media, Khomeini had "made 
the Revolution, instead of the other way around".42 For example, 
the February 1, 1979 issue of the New York Times reported that: 
Khomeini, the man who brought down the Shah and has 
called for a new Iranian Islamic republic, left here 
(Paris, France) today to return to his country. 
The paper thereby personalized and reduced absurdly a complex and 
important event. 
The deterioration that plagued the Shah's regime, the 
charisma displayed by Khomeini, and the overall evolution of 
40 Ibid., 1495. 
41 Dorman and Farhang, The U.S. Press and Iran, 161. 
42 Ibid., 160. 
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Iranian society together with widespread legitimate societal and 
political grievances spawned the "revolution" of 1979. Did the 
American media portray this development as anything less than 
abrupt and senseless? According to a majority of u.s. 
journalists, the Iranian Revolution represented the work of 
"turbaned religious zealots ll , not the culmination of disgust with 
the Shah by a vast majority of Iranians and the ushering in of a 
new and potent ideology.43 The press had not provided the tools 
by which the American public could have understood the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978-79 based on the variety of forces at work in 
Iran. 
American reporters neither understood nor correctly 
interpreted what was going on in Iran. Using shallow and highly 
ethnocentric stereotypes and frameworks perpetuated by their 
dependency on governmental sources, they portrayed the revolt 
instead as a kneejerk religious reaction. The media, intern, 
could not have interpreted this situation in any other way 
considering the strictures that the u.s. government forced upon 
them. They entirely missed the significance of Shi'ism as a 
cultural force. According to Dorman: 
... Iranians, although not particularly pious ... 
nevertheless turned to the traditional value system 
represented by Shi'ism as a means of expressing their 
profound rejection of the Shah's reBression and 
mindless pursui t of things Western. 4 
Americans were only was allow to know enough about this region to 
43 I bid., 166. 
44 I bid., 1 7 4 • 
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accommodate the u.s. government's interests and growing economic 
involvement in the Middle East. The lack of context by which to 
judge the situation in Iran caused Americans to interpret the 
forces in Iran in 1979 as reactionary, abrupt, fanatical, and 
profoundly dangerous. 
The tendency for our news to trickle down from self-serving 
government sources is clearly evident throughout the newspaper 
coverage of the return of Khomeini to Iran in early February of 
1979. The Chicago Tribune, the Indianapolis star, and the Muncie 
Star basically communicate the same information about Khomeini 
and Iran, much of it highly ethnocentric and biased, from 
February 1-4. 
The Chicago Tribune's lead article on February I, 1979, 
entitled, "Khomeini in Iran: 'Oust all foreigners''', is a good 
example of ethnocentric journalism. The article strictly 
concentrates on the words and ideas of Khomeini, deeming them 
largely unreasonable: 
Khomeini said foreign advisers in Iran are 
trying to restore Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi 
to the throne and install a government that 
'will obey the imperialists'. 
In this statement, the meanings of the words, "Pahlavi," 
"throne," and "imperialists" are translated by the u.s. press in 
a way that does not communicate what Khomeini actually meant. 
For the press, "Pahlavi" represents legitimacy and order; the 
"throne" stands for security; and "imperialists" is a 
exaggeration of America's role by the illegitimate Khomeini. The 
meanings in the Iranian context were quite different, however. 
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The Ayatollah Khomeini viewed the "throne" as a western vice used 
by the "imperialist" Americans to further their national 
interests in the Middle East through the puppet leadership of 
"Pahlavi". He knew that many Iranians would see the words in 
this light and respond accordingly. In further descriptions of 
Khomeini's entourage, security factors are emphasized: 
Iranian air force officers carrying submachine 
guns surrounded the auto and ran along side it 
as Khomeini was driven to a ceremonial pavilion 
to receive his followers. 45 
The specific association of the Ayatollah Khomeini with violence, 
terrorism and insecurity, a highly ethnocentric and narrow 
parameter of judgment, is woven into the rest of the article. 
The Chicago Tribune's headline articles from February 1-3, 
all make a point of describing the Ayatollah Khomeini as "white-
bearded". Perhaps he is just a "crazy old man," the articles 
seem to imply, which implicitly refutes any legitimacy in his 
efforts to change the government in Iran. 
In the Indianapolis Star, the use of similar descriptions 
and emphases serve to perpetuate the same images of Khomeini. On 
the front page of the February 2, 1979 issue, a large-lettered 
headline proclaims, "u.S. 'Tricked' Iran: Khomeini," with a sub-
headline which read, "Vow to Kick All 'Foreign Devils Out"'. 
Instead of "oust," as used in the Tribune, the Star decided to 
use the word, "kick. . out," in describing Khomeini's 
intentions to root out foreign influences. The use of this word 
45 The Chicago Tribune 1 February 1979. 
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adds a flicker of childishness to the cause of Khomeini. Leaders 
of countries do not "kick" out the "bad guys"; they negotiate 
through democratic means. Khomeini is portrayed as totally 
unreasonable, much like a spoiled child. Further in this 
article, the use of the words "screaming" and "swarming" to 
describe the followers of Khomeini is extremely degrading and 
offensive. Are these people human beings, or just children? 
Perhaps they are bumble bees? The oriental ism that seeps into 
our press tends to view people from "non-Western" regions as 
brainless and almost non-human. 
In the Muncie Star of Muncie, Indiana, the same sentiment 
reverberates. The headline article on February 1, 1979 is almost 
identical to the one used in the Chicago Tribune. Fear of 
terrorist retaliations stemming from the arrival of Khomeini is 
the main theme of this Associated Press article: 
Security men appointed by the local opposition 
leaders sealed off Tehran's international airport 
as the 78-year-old ayatollah disembarked from his 
chartered Air France jetliner accompanied by some 
50 of his followers. 46 
The use of the words "local opposition," " 78-year-old," and 
"followers" in this sentence convey certain images. The local 
opposition refers generically to the supporters of Khomeini and 
do not explain why these people are in opposition to the Shah. 
Again, the extreme old age of the Ayatollah Khomeini is 
emphasized, deeming him more ready for retirement than a revolt. 
The word "follower" likens the supporter of Khomeini to sheep, 
46 The Muncie Star (Muncie, Indiana), 1 February, 1979. 
again perpetuating the orientalist, "non-human" image of 
Iranians. 
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The recurrent themes of fear and terrorism stemming from the 
actions of an illegitimate old man are just as blatantly 
described in this local publication as its larger competitors in 
Indianapolis and Chicago. All employ the same words and similar 
themes. Altogether, there is a steady outpouring of 
ethnocentric, "pro-American-foreign-pol icy-interests" attitude 
that seeps out from each assertion or idea. 
The New York Times presented a wide variety of articles 
during the crucial revolutionary years of 1978 and 1979. 
Nevertheless, the range of subjects, in general, seldomly curbed 
the overall tendency to misinform. In the December 13, 1978 
edition, an article entitled "Carter Deplores Agitation Against 
Shah From outside" by Terence Smith is a perfect example. 
President Jimmy Carter is interpreted as saying that the Shah " 
. would be able to ride out the current difficulties". By late 
1978, the Shah was in dire straits politically, as uprising after 
uprising shook the fragile foundation of his regime. Despite 
this unrest, Carter chose to tell the press that things were 
getting better, when in statements made the week before, in which 
he asserted that the " . Shah's future was in the hands of the 
Iranian people" seeming to predict doom and disaster. 
The Carter Administration did not know how to react to this 
crumbling ally's woes. It could only see the catastrophic impact 
that a "loss" of this country's political and economic position 
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in the Middle East could warrant for the United states of 
America. The press listened to Carter's words and 
unquestioningly wrote them down for the American people to read, 
illustrating how the media and the political elite of America are 
linked in a way that hinders the quality of our press coverage. 
It is interesting that the New York Times closed its bureau 
in Tehran in early 1977, just as this major story began to break! 
The Iranian Revolution was covered from Washington, Beirut or 
Cairo, or via short "fact-finding" missions to Iran for specific 
stories. 47 Absentee journalism could be accepted from a smaller 
newspaper, but from the New York Times? The stories that the 
larger newspapers supposedly investigate more thoroughly trickles 
down through the Associated Press or the United Press 
International to the more low-budget, local presses. The New 
York Times perpetuated the simplistic and distorted theme that "a 
religious reaction and not a quest for participation and equity 
explained events in troubled Iran". 48 
The news that reached the American people portrayed the 
entire situation in a way that misconstrued the reasoning behind 
the Iranian population's uprising and the actions of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. From an American point of view, any type of 
"religious" revolution is deemed reactionary. This ideology 
stems from our liberal roots in religious toleration and the 
perceived need for a "separation of church and state". A 
47 Dorman and Farhang, The U.s. Press and Iran, 154. 
48 I bid. I 1 ':l 'J • 
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movement towards a "theocratic" state, specifically one based in 
Shi'ism as in Iran, runs contrary to the supposed American view 
of religion and politics. This image was easily perpetuated in 
the press and accepted as intolerable by most Americans. In 
American society, progressivism involves democratic notions that 
would be interpreted far differently when related to most Islamic 
religious/political doctrines, especially in Shi'ism. Politics 
and religion are meshed together in a unique way in "Islamic" 
countries that would not easily be transferable into a "Western" 
thought structure. The American Revolution was based on the 
progressive, Enlightenment idea that our "rights as Englishmen" 
had been violated. 
According to Hannah Arendt in On Revolution, a revolution is 
reformist, at first, and only becomes revolutionary when new 
events change the goals . Revolution occurs, says Arendt: 
.. . where change occurs in the sense of a new 
beginning, where violence is used to constitute 
an altogether different form of government. 49 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 dealt with interpretation and 
ideology from within an evolving historical framework that 
spanned three centuries. The Revolution in Iran was clearly 
reformist, in varying degrees, until the poorer, urban (and thus 
innovative) Iranians became more actively involved in the 
uprisings in the late 1970s. These circumstances caused the 
"revolution" to begin, with Ayatollah Khomeini and others 
directing future events by seizing an opportunity to turn things 
49 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking), 28. 
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in their direction. Khomeini's position and prestige in Iranian 
society allowed him to ultimately to represent the Revolution of 
1979: 
Khomeini did not cause the revolution, but it 
is no exaggeration to say that he single-handedly 
transformed a. . reform movement with limited 
objectives into a genuinely revolutionar¥c experience 
with its own unique ideological content. 0 
There is no doubt that the Revolution of 1978-79 in Iran would 
not have ended the way it did without the figure of Khomeini. 
The problem, however, was that our media continually portrayed 
Khomeini as the "Revolution". Recent questioning of the u.s. 
media's coverage of the Iranian Revolution is not based solely on 
the fact that the reporters knew so little about "Islam"; quite 
to the contrary, it lay in the media's: 
pretending that a great deal was known and in 
presenting a view of Iran's revolution that was 
dictated more by official Washington than by 
reality.51 
The financial and personnel limitations of the media prevented it 
once again from telling us the "whole" story. If only it had 
admitted its limitations. 
The press encouraged Americans to doubt whether the Iranian 
people were capable of authentic interest in freedom or whether 
they were capable of achieving political stability without a 
dictator or foreign influence. 52 Our entire way of viewing 
50 Sick, All Fall Down, 158. 
51 Dorman and Farhang, The U.S. Press and Iran, 179. 
52 Ibid., 180. 
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"freedom" or "stability" could not be used in the same context as 
a description of "Iranian," IIShi'ite,1I or IIIslamic" freedom or 
stability. Ethnocentrism, orientalism, and a fierce suspicion of 
the religion of Islam soaked into the American mind, putting 
blinders on us when we thought that we were seeing a wide 
spectrum. Even though America's relationship to the Middle East 
is more important than ever, these blinders remain in place. The 
way in which our country perceives the region of the Middle East 
supposedly reinforces our national interests in this region; 
however, it seems to be pulling America farther away from these 
countries, separating us from crucial resources and strategic 
areas. 
Conclusion 
The resurgence of interest in the Middle East has recreated 
the unfortunate association between things unpleasant, 
unamerican, and undemocratic and things IIIslamic" or "Middle 
Eastern. II Of all major western countries, America has had the 
shortest tradition of interaction with the Middle East, yet its 
media and intellectuals are writing more about this region than 
the writers of any other nation. This proliferation brings about 
the frequent occasion for generalizations and secondhand sources 
in published articles and essays. Islam and the Middle East, in 
all of their diversity, are reduced to lIa special malevolent and 
unthinking essence. ,,53 All of this so-called new and exciting 
53 Said, Covering Islam, 8. 
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knowledge pouring from the souls of Americana is bound within "an 
inverted or culturally determined ideological framework filled 
with passion, defensive prejudice, (and) sometimes even 
revulsion. ,,54 This multifarious information is molded in a way 
that reinforces u.s. government policy, which is at the root of 
America's perceptions about this region. 
The government of the united states of America and her media 
are woven together like a tightly knit sweater. Because of 
America's obsessive, growing interests in the Middle East, the 
media projects news from a "Manifest Destiny" mentality that 
projects the united states as the modernizer, legitimizing her 
right to rescue the backward, childish Iran. Enter the 
Revolution of 1978-79 . . WHY is Iran not grateful for the 
United States' efforts in supporting the "modern" regime of 
Mohammed Reza? Because of America's ingrained thought process 
regarding the Middle East, and as a result of the perpetuation of 
false notions, we could not understand. We were prevented from 
understanding. The American public will probably never 
understand the Middle East in a broader sense because of its 
ethnocentric and orientalist perceptions of this region and 
overall apathy about these issues. 
All of this goes much farther than just misconceptions. As 
a result of misinformation, often directed, the entire spectrum 
of Western (American) political thought has been polarized 
against "Islam" and the Middle East. In other words, two worlds 
54 b' d I 1 ., 6. 
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have been created . . OURS AND THEIRS.55 But there are many 
different "worlds" within the spectrum of this obvious 
generalization. Americans are subject to an almost unconscious 
ideological framework in regards to the Middle East that 
generalizes this entire area. This framework prevents our people 
and government from taking an in-depth look at how a broader 
knowledge of these various countries could affect the way in 
which the Middle East and America interact with one another. 
What might the tragic history of Iranian-American relations 
teach us about current u.S. relationships in the Middle East? 
One thing is that we must look beyond the pages of newspapers in 
order to more fully understand the Middle East. It also should 
teach our government that in order to preserve America's vested 
economic interests in the region of the Middle East, drastic 
measures need to be taken. The U.S. government, specifically 
the Bush Administration, realized in early 1991 that in order to 
preserve our interests in the oil of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Iraq, something had to be done. The government decided to 
approach the situation in a more direct fashion, considering 
Carter and Reagan Administrations' past relationships in the 
Middle East. 
The u.S. presidencies of Reagan and Carter did not have a 
good record in political and economic dealings with the Middle 
East. While Carter "succeeded" with the Camp David Accords, he 
ignorantly denied what was happening in Iran in 1977-79. While 
55 b' d 11.,63. 
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Reagan bombed Libya, George Bush took a different approach. In 
truth, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Operation 
Uesert Storm can be viewed as a carefully laid out means of 
gaining political support. 56 The U.S. media aided the 
administration's ploy. Reporters all but ignored the united 
States's past relationship with Iraq and the subsequent military 
expenditures given to the government under Saddam Hussein. 
During the 1980s, the u.S. supplied billions of dollars 
worth of arms to both Iran and Iraq, via both legitimate and 
questionable means. During his vice-presidency, Bush was 
relatively silent about the Middle East and later, during the 
beginning of his presidency, he mentioned nothing about Iraq. 
As in the past, the news media failed to inform the u.S. public 
about this all-encompassing issue: 
The news media did much to befog the 
atmosphere. . def ining the issues . 
as the White House framed them for the press. 57 
Just as the media did not tell us about all aspects of the 
Iranian Revolution, in the case of the Gulf War reports, again 
was limited by lack of expertise and what the Pentagon would 
allow them to tell the public. 
Relating to this issue, the New York Times cover-story on 
January 15, 1991 (the eve of Operation Desert Storm) had 
absolutely no first-hand accounts from journalists in Kuwait or 
~ Stephen Graubard, Mr. Bush's War (New York: Hill and Wang), 
introduction. 
57 Ib' d .. 1 ., Xli. 
38 
Iraq, not to mention the entire Middle East. The entire account 
was presented from Washington sources, "officials" as they were 
called. Perhaps "officials" were the only sources to which the 
New York Times or any other newspaper had access. 
It is interesting that neither Reagan nor Bush had professed 
"outrage" over the Iraqi invasion of Iran as they did over the 
lnvdsion of Kuwait. The Ayatollah's problems were conveniently 
called as all of his own making, not worthy of u.s. concern. 
Again, as with the Iranian Revolution, the White House and the 
media cooperated to produce myths, although they were rarely 
recognized as such. 58 
On top of the self-imposed limitations of the media, the 
government works to organize the press in a way that limits its 
capacity for quality, investigative reporting. Before and during 
Operation Desert storm, there were an unprecedented number of 
journalists covering the war. Of the 1400 reporters, editors, 
photographers, dnd technicians, however, only 192 news people 
were scheduled to be out with the combat forces. 59 All of the 
media attention surrounding the Persian Gulf was carefully 
organized into Pentagon "press pools" that further limited the 
scope and range of reporting: 
Pentagon organized pools use the U.S. media 
as unpaid employees of the Dept. of Defense, 
on whose behalf these media figures prepare 
the news of the war for the outer world . 
58 I bid., 1 9 7 . 
59 Debra 
Publisher 7: 
Gersh, "War Information 
(July 1991) 10. 
Hearings," Editor and 
. The pool system was used in the Persian 
Gulf not to facilitate news coverage, but to 
control it. w 
In addition to the limitations that the media puts upon 
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itself, whether conscious or unconscious, the government works to 
control the media and use it for its own propaganda. The mass 
media also serves to mobilize support for the special interests 
that dominate the state and private activity of America. 61 
The factors of governmental foreign policy objectives, 
ingrained misconceptions and stereotypes, media misleadings, and 
general apathy continue to dominate America's attitudes toward 
the Middle East. The relationship between all of these problems 
is quite complex, leading to feelings of confusion and 
hopelessness by those who understand the implications of this 
ignorance. However, a conscious realization of these factors is 
a first step in chipping away at the layers of stone that hide 
the diamond inside -- the truth about the people, the religions, 
and the diversity of the Middle East -- from us all. 
Our media and our government, together, perpetuate unfair 
images of the Middle East. The recognition of this tendency is 
important if relations between this region and the United states 
are to improve, thus creating positive economic and political 
linkages. By putting aside our ethnocentric and orientalist 
thought structure in regards to the Middle East, these linkages 
can grow stronger. We can then perhaps understand the region of 
W Ibid., 10. 
61 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, introduction. 
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the Middle East for what it is in all facets of culture, 
religion, economics, and religions. 
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